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Recent terrorist activities (the World Trade Center
bombing, the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing, the release
of Sarin Gas in the Tokyo subway, etc.) have focused the
national leadership on the topic of terrorism inside the
borders of the United States. In response, two Presidential
Decision Directives (PDD-62 and PDD-63) were issued to help
define the terrorist threat and recommend a counter-
terrorism organization in the federal government.
However, the directives do not determine how the Federal
government works with state and local authorities. The
directives also do not focus on local, state, and federal
capabilities to preempt a possible terrorist attack. This
thesis builds a organizational framework of the U. S.
counter-terrorism environment; explains the current U. S.
counter- terrorism structure from a local perspective;
develops a set of principles that could be used by any local
or federal agency to develop a new or more efficient
counter-terrorism organization; assesses two domestic
counter- terrorism organizations; and proffers specific
recommendations on how U. S. counter-terrorism organizations
and programs could be more efficient.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM: WHY THIS TOPIC?
The acquisition, proliferation, threatened or actual
use of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group or
individuals constitutes one of the gravest threats to the
United States. (Louis J. Freeh, 1997)
This thesis links our dual interest in domestic
counterterrorism and organizational theory. In pursuing
this interest, we were unable to find a study that explains
how to organize most effectively local, state and federal
organizations to preempt terrorism in the U.S. The purpose
of this thesis is to just that; to try and determine the
best way to organize to preempt the threat posed by domestic
terrorism.
Why is it important to organize better to combat
domestic terrorism? One reason is that domestic terrorism
in the U.S. will not just go away. It is likely that there
will continue to be individuals and groups that are
disgruntled with U.S. policies and will use terrorism to
voice their concerns. Further, many experts agree that
terrorism in the U.S. will become more lethal, and might
possibly include the use of a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) , as FBI director Louis Freeh notes in our quotation at
the head of this chapter. For the United States the problem
is stopping domestic terrorism before it happens. The
question we pursue here is how should we organize to do so.
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B . METHODOLOGY
This thesis will use Transorganizational Development
(Cummings, 1984) and Differentiated Network (Nohria and
Ghoshal, 1997) theory to evaluate current organizational
systems for combatting domestic terrorism. We picked these
two theories because they both are currently accepted and
have been used to evaluate other multi -agency organizations.
Another reason we picked them is because they address
problems that multi -agency systems have when trying to solve
a common problem. Also, most organization theories focus on
single organization design. These theories, by contrast,
look at the problems associated with multi -organization
systems. Combating domestic terrorism in the U.S. requires
multiple Federal, State and Local agencies to work together
to solve a common problem. These theories in particular,
therefore, are relevant to the organizational problems
associated with combating domestic terrorism.
Differentiated Network theory and Cumming's
Transorganizational Systems theory, however, were developed
using corporate organizations as models and do not
completely parallel current United States counter-terrorism
organizations. While we believe that most of the
observations that Nohria, Ghoshal, and Cummings make are
valid and applicable to the situation of domestic counter-
2
terrorism, we realize that there may be specific instances
where their observations do not fit current counter-
terrorism organization. Therefore, we will use these
theories as a general guideline but will make some changes
to reflect unique counter-terrorism (C-T) organizational
requirements. We explain this further in Chapter III.
As a tool to focus our research, we developed research
questions from the material present in these two
organizational theories. The research questions are: 1)
How should the United States organize to preempt domestic
terrorism? 2) What is the current counter-terrorist
situation in the United States? 3) What current
organizational structure exists to counter domestic
terrorism in the United States? 4) How well does the
domestic counter-terrorism organization structure currently
match the terrorist situation in the United States? 5) What
principles and/or processes would help the United States to
organize more efficiently?
We have attempted to answer our research questions by
gathering data from three sources: 1) The Monterey County
Office of Emergency Services, 2) Los Angeles Emergency
Operation Center Terrorism Working Group, 3) Open source
archival data. The results of this study should ultimately
answer the question of how a United States inter-
governmental organization structure should be formed to
facilitate a rapid transition to crisis management with a
minimal warning time.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II describes a typical terrorist event, the
current C-T organization in the United States, and the
problems facing this organization. Chapter III explains the
Transorganizational Development and Differentiated Network
theories and applies them to the current US domestic CT
organization. It concludes with a list of principles used
to evaluate the efficiency of the current domestic terrorism
organization. In Chapter IV we use these principles to
evaluate the Monterey County Office of Emergency Services
and the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group.
Chapter V offers our conclusions and recommendations
pertaining to the current structure.
D. DEFINITIONS
The following are important definitions used in this
thesis
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) - As defined by
Title 18, U. S. C. 2332a, is: a weapon of mass
destruction as (1) any destructive device as
defined in section 921 of this title, [which
reads] any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas,
bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge
of more than four ounces, missile having an
explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-
quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the
above; (2) poison gas; (3) any weapon involving a
disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at
a level dangerous to human life (FEMA, 1997)
.
Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) . -
SEMS is focused on standardizing the
organizational structure and terminology at all
levels. It is the system used for coordinating
state and local emergency response in ^California.
SEMS provides for a multiple level response
organization that facilitates the flow of
emergency information and resources within and
between the organizational levels. Five
management levels (field, local government,
operational area, regional, and state) are
identified, along with the responsibilities and
methods of operations. SEMS development involved
coordination with all interested state and
emergency management agencies. SEMS became
effective on December 1, 1996 (California, 1998).
Unified Command Structure (UCS) - The California
Office of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement
Guide for Emergency Operations (1998) defines the
UCS as the following: A procedure used at
incidents which allows all agencies with
geographical, legal or functional responsibility
to establish a common set of incident objectives
and strategies, and a single incident action plan
(p. 17.) .
"
Terrorism - Deliberate creation and exploitation
of fear through violence or the threat of violence
in the pursuit of political change (Hoffman, p.
43. , 1998) .
Significant Threat - A significant threat is the
confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD
capable of causing a significant destructive event
prior to actual injury or property loss (FEMA,
1997)
.
Credible Threat - a verbal or written statement
gathered from intelligence or any other activity
(FEMA, 1997) .
Consequence Management - includes measures to
protect public health and safety, restore
essential government services, and provide
emergency relief to governments, businesses and
individuals affected by the consequences of
terrorism. The laws of the United States assign
primary authority to the States to respond to the
consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government
provides assistance as required (FEMA, 1997)
.
Crisis Management - includes measures to identify,
acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to
anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or
act of terrorism. The laws of the United States
assign primary authority to the Federal Government
to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State
and local governments provide assistance as
required. Crisis management is -predominantly a
law enforcement response. Based on the situation,
a Federal crisis management response may be
supported by technical operations, and by Federal





The purpose of this chapter is to present the situation
encountered by the network of local, state, and federal
agencies in the United States that combat terrorism. We
will use a detailed synopsis of a terrorism incident and an
illustration of the current counter-terrorism (C-T)
structures at the local, state, and federal levels. We will
then characterize the C-T situation in terms of problem
structuredness, task interdependence, complexity, and
availability of resources. These are analytical terms we
have taken from Nohria, Ghoshal (1997) and Cummings (1984)
.
In Chapter III we will use these terms to select which
organizational principles are most important when designing
a C-T organization.
B. THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING
According to the presiding judge of the World Trade
Center Bombing trial, the bombing that took place on
February 26, 1993 was intended to topple the building amid a
cloud of cyanide gas killing tens of thousands of Americans
(Mylorie, 1995) . While the intent to use cyanide gas has
been questioned (Parachini, 2000), the bomb did kill six,
injure a thousand more, and cause over 3 00 million dollars
in property damage (Childers, 1998) . Eventually, five
foreign national conspirators were brought to trial . One
still remains at large (Childers, 1998) . The events leading
up to the bombing begin to show how difficult it is to
counter domestic terrorism in the United States. This case
also illustrates the large number of interdependent actors
that can be present in just one incident of terrorism.
C. SYNOPSIS OF A TERRORIST INCIDENT
In September 1991, Ahmad Ajaj entered the United States
under the guise of demanding political asylum from Israel.
In April of 1992 he traveled to Pakistan under an assumed
name before his hearing on asylum with the INS. While in
Pakistan, Ajaj attended a terrorist training camp and began
plotting with Ramzi Yousef to blow up the World Trade
Center. Almost a year later, on August 31, 1992, Ajaj and
Yousef attempted to enter the U.S. using fake passports.
Yousef was initially detained because he did not have a
valid U.S. Visa, but was released because he claimed he paid
a Pakistani to let him board the plane and wanted political
asylum in the U.S. Ajaj was detained due to a suspicious
passport and for carrying bomb-making notebooks, videotapes,
and manuals. Ultimately, Ajaj was imprisoned for six months
and Yousef entered New York and began to work. (Childers,
1998)
8
For the next four months Yousef worked with two trusted
co-conspirators, Mohamed Salameh and Abdul Rahman Yasin, to
obtain the money and supplies for the bomb. They also
secured an apartment and a storage facility. The supplies
for the bomb were all easily obtained through local chemical
supply companies. They purchased and had delivered to the
storage shed 1500 pounds of urea and 1672 pounds of nitric
acid (Reeve, 1999) .
Having secured the essential materials, during January
and February 1993 the conspirators began mixing the bomb in
their rented apartment. On February 23, 1993, the plotters
rented a Ryder Ford Cargo Van. On February 25, 1993, the
conspirators reported the van stolen and gave the wrong
license plate number so the police could not track the van.
On February 25, 1993, the conspirators loaded the van with
their bomb and the next day drove the van to the B-2 level
of the World Trade Center. At 12:18 p.m. the van exploded.
Within 2 days all of the conspirators escaped the country
except Salameh, who tried unsuccessfully to get back his
deposit for the van (Reeve, 1999)
.
In order to bring these criminals to justice, the FBI's
New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) was called into
action within minutes of the attack. The JTTF was
originally formed in 1980 with 25-30 investigators from the
NYPD and the FBI. At the time of the bombing, the New York
JTTF had grown to 40-50 investigators from the FBI, NYPD,
State Department, Secret Service, INS, FAA, U. S. Marshals,
ATF, New York State Police, and the Port Authority Police.
This team was permanently on duty in Manhattan. These
investigators immediately began analyzing incoming calls
claiming responsibility for the bombing. By the end of the
weekend of the bombing more than 3 calls had been
registered claiming responsibility for the attack. Within a
week, the FBI alone had 70 investigators working the case.
Eventually, the U.S. government was able to work with other
countries and bring 5 of the conspirators to trial (Reeve,
1999) .
Given the interagency character of the JTTF, a close
look at the current counter-terrorism organization is
warranted in order to understand the mandates and agency
interplay that now define U. S. domestic counter-terrorism.
D. COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION
The following passage summarizes the historical
background of executive branch action and legislative acts
that have occurred in the last 5 years. Specifically this
passage summarizes the key actions that Presidential
Decision Directives (PDDs) 39, 62, and 63 directed. The
10
Ant i -Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenci Act supported the Clinton Administrations
focus on the potential threat of WMD.
In 1995, President Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) , the
"U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism. " This directive
assigned the FBI as the lead federal agency to
coordinate all aspects of the Federal response to
a WMD incident. It also established the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead
federal agency for addressing the effects or
potential effects of such an incident on public
health, safety, and the environment.
In 1996, the Ant i -Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act tasked FEMA to develop and
deliver training to firefighters and emergency
medical personnel . Congress provided financing to
the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1996 to provide
WMD training and assistance to state and local
authorities. This training effort, referred to as
Nunn-Lugar-Dominici after its sponsoring senators,
designated the 120 largest cities in the United
States for specialized training and equipment
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Figure 1. Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Cities
Designated for WMD Training From Ref . [Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Map, 2000]
.
State and local first responders recommended
that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno name a
single agency to coordinate the numerous
preparedness efforts of first responders. In
response, she selected the FBI, due to the FBI's
unique geographic positioning across the United
States and its jurisdictional responsibility for
the prevention of, and response to, acts of
terrorism. [The FBI role as lead agency was given
executive branch approval by PDD-63 released in
May of 1998. PDD-62, the Combating Terrorism
Directive, also released in May of 1998 is related
to PDD-63 but remains classified.] She also
announced the establishment of a new National
Domestic Preparedness Office in Washington, D.C.
The FBI is leading this initiative in conjunction
with the Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, DoD, Department of Energy, Department of
Health and Human Services, FEMA, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. An advisory
committee composed of local law enforcement,
fire/hazmat departments, emergency medical
services, hospitals, public health organizations,
12
and state and local emergency response planners
are helping to establish training standards,
information sharing, equipping, planning, and
exercises for first responders
.
As the lead investigative agency, the FBI
derives its legal jurisdiction to deter,
investigate, direct, organize and prepare for a
terrorist incident from an assortment of federal
statutes and executive branch directives. Any
alleged or suspected criminal violations of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Statute and the
Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act will be
investigated by the FBI. The WMD Statute includes
the threat or use of a WMD weapon, and defines the
WMD weapon as any destructive device (i.e.
explosive or incendiary) , chemical or biological
agent, or the release of life threatening levels
of radioactive material. The Biological Weapons
Ant i -terrorism Act Statute specifically provides
for the prosecution of individuals who utilize
hoax devices. (FBI and Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 1999)
These three Presidential Directives and two legislative
acts provided the U. S. government the authority to create a
new federal level interagency organization to counter
domestic terrorism. (See Figure 2)
13
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Figure 2. Federal Domestic Counter-Terrorism
Organizational Chart From Ref . [Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Organizational Chart,
2000] .
According to PDD-63, the US CT organization displayed
in 'igure 2 :
. . .shall have achieved and shall maintain the
ability to prorcect our nation's critical
infrastructures from intentional aces that would
significantly diminish the abilities of:
the Federal Government to perform essential
national security missions and to ensure the
general public health and safety; state and local
government to maintain order and to deliver
minimum essential public services; the private
sector to ensure the orderly function of the
economy and the delivery of essential
telecommunications, energy, financial and
14
transportation services. (White Paper, p. 137,
1998)
The FBI, as the lead agency tasked with protecting our
infrastructures, has designated as one of its strategic
goals in its Strategic Plan for 1998-2003 to "prevent,
disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur"
(Freeh, 1999) . The FBI has focused primarily on "Crisis
Management", which it defines as actions taken before a
terrorist incident occurs. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) , by contrast, has been directed to focus on
"Consequence Management" designed to mitigate the effects of
a terrorist incident should it occur. The rest of the
Federal agencies listed above perform supporting roles in
technical areas of domestic counter-terrorism based on the
nature and progress of a terrorist incident. Because our
thesis focuses on the problem of preemption the
organizational analysis we have conducted is most pertinent
to the crisis prevention structure.
The Federal Government's structure was built around the
mandated participation of eight agencies, including the
Department of Defense, as prescribed in PDD-63. 1 It is
critical to note that although PDD-63 insists on interagency
15
coordination and information sharing at the federal level,
it makes little reference to the local and state
organizational structures in place to handle crises and
natural catastrophes. So how does all this new Federal
organization aid the prevention of terrorism at the local
level, and how are the local and state elements configured
in relation to the Federal bureaucratic structure?
In order to understand how local, state and federal
agencies work together to combat terrorism, we will examine
the California Office of Emergency Services as an
illustrative example. By looking at this example we will
get a clearer picture of the complexity, available
resources, task interdependency, and problem structuredness
that characterize the environment in which federal, state
and local officials operate. These features are important
to identify because they define which organization design
principles are most appropriate in this context. While the
California Office of Emergency Services (California OES,
1998) is not necessarily representative of every state's
emergency response system, it is typical.
'The seven federal agencies are: Commerce, EPA,
Transportation, Justice/FBI, FEMA, Health and Human
Services, and Energy.
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A successful organizational structure for combating
terrorism requires a complex network of federal and local
agencies. Using a business organization analogy, we can
think of the federal government as the corporate
headquarters; its product is the reduction of terrorist
incidents and their effects. The Federal Government,, like
the headquarters of a multi-national corporation (MNC)
,
realizes that the geographic expanse of its authority and
oversight is too great for it to effectively manage all the
components of the federal C-T organization. The federal
government delegates its authority to the Justice Department
and the FBI. The FBI in turn works through its regional
offices
.
These regional offices establish, as necessary, Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) that form the subsidiary level
of the organization. The JTTFs form networks in their
respective areas of responsibility through Emergency
Operation Service (EOS) sections at the state and local
level of government. The JTTF is the lowest level of
oversight the Federal Government, through the FBI, exerts on
the implementation and execution of counter-terrorism
procedures and policy until a crisis occurs.
17
In a time of crisis, the JTTFs organize according to
the nature of the incident and form a Joint Operations
Center (JOC) . The JOC interfaces directly with the county
or state emergency operation center at the incident site.
The JOC provides the federal interface between local, state
and federal emergency response systems and assumes a lead
agency role in resolving the federal crime of terrorism.
This relationship gives the JOC a structure that is similar
to the MNC structure presented as a differentiated network
by Nohria and Ghoshal . However, the JOC structure is
different from the MNC headquarter-subsidiary relationship
presented by Differentiated Network theory in that the FBI
does not have overarching decision or command authority over
the JOC's components, various local and state agencies. The
JOC works by consensus. This difference between the JOC and
the MNC leads us to modify Nohria and Ghoshal 's proposals
for effective multi -agency organizations for counter-
terrorism.
In order to prevent an incident, the local, state and
federal organizations converge on a threatened site based on
the mounting evidence of credible and significant threats.
A significant threat is required for the FBI to conduct a
threat assessment (FEMA, 1997, pg. 7) . The threat
18
assessment is the evaluation procedure that the FBI uses to
determine if a preventive response is necessary and whether
it needs to begin coordination with local agencies.
Local authorities help gather intelligence and provide
the initial reports of credible and significant threats to
the FBI. They will also be most likely to respond first to
a potential terrorist activity, and will make initial
decisions on how to react to a threat. Therefore, an
intimate understanding of local emergency systems and their
workings is necessary.
Local authorities (city police, state police, and
sheriffs) organize along jurisdictional boundaries within
cities and counties. An example of the California
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Figure 3. California SEMS Jurisdictions.
From Ref. [California OES Regions, 2000].
These jurisdictional boundaries make coordination
necessary through state mutual aid systems. In California,
the system is called the Standardized Emergency Management
System (SEMS)
.
While SEMS is primarily used for emergencies, it is
also the basis of coordination for counter- terrorism
activities. In relation to counter-terrorism, SEMS
facilitates law enforcement information and resource
sharing. An example of this sharing would be that the
counter-terrorism cells of city police and sheriff's
departments communicate frequently to share information on
potential terrorists and to coordinate counter terrorist
20
activities. Further, these agencies could provide resources
to one another if needed.
The local FBI office facilitates information sharing
between local authorities and federal authorities. The
local Special Agent -in- Charge is the primary point of
contact between local law enforcement and the federal office
but information sharing also occurs through electronic alert
messages and distributed incident reports.
Local agents also conduct threat assessments and
coordinate the initial FBI involvement in an incident.
Should the evaluation of a threat assessment call for
Federal participation, federal, state, and local authorities
will operate under a Unified Command Structure (UCS)
.
The Unified Command Structure is a command and control
procedure governing mult i -agency cooperation. It operates
through consensus . The process of arriving at a consensus
through the application of the UCS is achieved by the
participating agencies agreeing on common operational goals
and objectives for an incident. The California Office of
Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency
Operations (1999) defines the UCS as:
A procedure used at incidents which allows
all agencies with geographical, legal or
functional responsibility to establish a common
21
set of incident objectives and strategies, and a
single incident action plan (p. 17.)
The Federal Emergency Management Agency2 uses slightly
different wording to define the UCS. However, a clear sense
of interagency cooperation is represented in their
definition:
A unified team effort which allows all
agencies with responsibility for the incident,
either geographic or functional, to manage an
incident by establishing a common set of incident
objectives or strategies (FEMA, pg. A-12, 1998).
Regardless of the definition, it is apparent that the
Unified Command Structure is a procedure designed to resolve
conflicting issues of materiel, personnel, and jurisdiction
in a situation in which there is no centralized authority.
The UCS is decision-making by consensus. The results of the
UCS are codified in the set of incident goals, objectives,
and strategies applied in incident action plans.
The JTTF, JOC, and all SEMS elements use the UCS as a
decision-making system. The Los Angeles Terrorism Early
Warning Group (TEW) is a working example of an organization
that uses a Unified Command Structure. According to John P.
Sullivan, director the LA TEW, the UCS provides [an
organization the ability to] "gauge resource needs and
22
shortfalls, continuously monitor and assess situational
awareness/status, and act as the POC for inter-agency
liaison in order to develop options for courses of action
(COAs) for incident resolution" (Sullivan, Interview, 2000)
An organizational chart of the Los Angeles County TEW is
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Figure 4. TEW Organization
From Ref. [Sullivan, Briefing, 2000].
Like the TEW, the JOC also operates under the UCS
.
Once a significant threat is identified during the threat
assessment process, the local FBI Special Agent -In- Charge
can request the authority to set up a Joint Operations
Center (JOC)
.
3 The FBI Field Office forms a Joint Operations
2 FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, Basic Incident
Command System (ICS) Independent Study IS
-195, (1998)
In the event that the FBI has determined the presence of a
"significant threat" the FBI "simultaneously advises the
Attorney General, who notifies the President and NSC groups
as warranted, that a Federal crisis management response is
required. If Federal crisis management response is
authorized, the FBI activates multi -agency crisis management
structures at FBI headquarters, the responsible FBI field
office and at the incident site." (FEMA, 1997, pg. 7)
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Center in order to provide the command structure necessary
to provide a flexible response to the crisis. The UCS is an
integral part of the formation of the JOC once a significant
threat has been assessed. The UCS guides the implementation,
configuration, and composition of the JOC based on the
particular incident. According to the FEMA PDD-39 Terrorism
Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan (FEMA, 1997)
:
The JOC structure includes the following standard
groups: Command, Operations, Support, and
Consequence Management. Representation within the
JOC includes some Federal, State, and local
agencies with roles in consequence management.
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Figure 5. JOC Organization Structure
From Ref . [FEMA, 1997]
.
The JOC forms the basis for any further investigative
requirements during a terrorist crisis and uses the Unified
Command Structure in order to determine future action plans,
resources and objectives established by SEMS (or any other
state designed emergency structure) . The FBI On-Scene
Commander (OSC) is the command authority of the JOC and a
member of the UCS structure. As such, the FBI OSC advises
on operational plans and provides resources that influence
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the development of the UCS objectives and goals. However,
will ultimately reflect a consensus of the Local and State
Law enforcement involved with the FBI in pre-empting
incident. The JOC can also provide a link to additional
external equipment, resources, and personnel not readily
available to the local responders. The JOC is the
integrated organizational structure that provides
information sharing between crisis and consequence
management responders. Once the JOC is established all
local, state and federal law enforcement and emergency
service management personnel support the investigation
effort through the collective objectives set forth by the
UCS.
E. THE COUNTERTERRORIST SITUATION
Using the characteristics of the World Trade Center
Bombing and the description of the current C-T crisis
management structure that we have just given, we will now
describe the situation faced by this structure in terms of
key concepts from organization theory: problem
structuredness, task interdependence, available resources,
and complexity.
We chose the two organizational theories we are using,
from which we have taken these four concepts, because,
unlike most organizational theories, they focus on a system
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of multiple organizations working together to solve a common
problem. Both theories recognize the classic contributions
of other organizational theorists and build upon their
principles. In Transorganizational Development theory,
Cummings (1984) suggests that we must first determine the
level of problem structuredness and task interdependence
between organizations in order to determine the most
critical organizing principles. In The Differentiated
Network, Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) use environmental
complexity (High or Low) and the availability of resources
to determine the most pertinent organizing principles. In
order to build a typology in Chapter III, we will now
describe why we believe the C-T organization faces a
situation of low problem structuredness, high task
interdependence, a high degree of complexity, and low
availability of resources. We will discuss each of these
terms in detail in the following sections.
1. Low Problem Structuredness
Cummings states low problem structuredness results in a
situation that is highly complex, highly uncertain, and
highly conflictual (Cummings, 1984) . Low problem
structuredness means the problem is poorly defined and not
very clear. An example of a problem with high
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structuredness would be stopping speeders in front of a
school. In this case one knows the speed limit and the law,
where to look for lawbreakers, and what to do when the law
is broken. Because all these things are known, the problem
of stopping speeders has a lot of structure. On the other
hand, the problem of stopping terrorism lacks structure
because much less can be known about terrorism. A terrorist
event can happen anywhere, at any time, and is not as
clearly defined or quantifiable as a speeding incident.
Further, the terrorist has many means to commit his crime
whereas a speeder can only speed using a vehicle. Because a
terrorist incident lacks definition, the situation faced by
a C-T organization is one of low problem structuredness.
2 . High Task Interdependence
Task interdependence is the degree to which the
effectiveness of an organization depends on coordination of
members' efforts, skills, and information (Cummings, pp.
395, 1984) . In a situation when many organizations must
work together, high task interdependence means that many
organizations must work together to solve a common problem
because they cannot solve the problem alone. Again,
stopping a speeder in front of a school is an example of a
problem with low task interdependence. This problem does
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not require much coordination among agencies or skill
sharing in order for the organization to be effective. One
policeman from one jurisdiction can generally solve this
problem. Countering terrorism, on the other hand, depends
on multiple agencies sharing resources, skills, and
information to be effective. In the World Trade Center
bombing, local law enforcement agencies worked with state
and federal agencies in order to bring the criminals to
justice. This creates a situation of high task
interdependence
.
3 . High Complexity
To determine which organizing principles are most
important, Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) look at the complexity
(high or low) of the organization's working environment.
For the purpose of this thesis, we define this environment
as everything that is relevant to the problem the
organization is trying to solve. For two reasons, we
contend that the environment faced by a C-T organization is
high in complexity. First, the problem of countering
terrorism is low in structure and high in uncertainty.
Problems with low structure and high uncertainty contain a
large number of possible threats, actors, resources, or
opportunities that might potentially be part of the problem
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and its solution. Such environments are highly complex.
The second reason the C-T environment is highly complex is
because of a high degree of organizational complexity
inherent in countering terrorism. Many different kinds of
organizations must cooperate to succeed at this task. As we
will explain below, when combined, these characteristics
make the environment of C-T organizations highly complex.
The first reason the C-T situation is highly complex is
because the problem is low in structuredness and high in
uncertainty. As Cummings states, problems with low
structuredness create situations that are highly complex.
The problem of countering terrorism is low in structure,
which makes the C-T situation more complex than one that is
more structured such as stopping speeders. Further
contributing to the complexity in the C-T environment is the
uncertainty the organization must attempt to counteract.
Uncertainty is defined as "not knowing the value of a
variable" (Burton and Obel, 1998) . In terrorism this means
not knowing who will potentially take action. Further, the
terrorist has many weapons and, therefore, the method of
attack is also uncertain. The problem of counter- terrorism
would have low uncertainty and more structure if terrorists
all dressed in red skirts and white T-shirts, attacked on
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the first Monday of the month at 5 am, and only used car
bombs, but they do not.
Compounding the uncertainty in the C-T environment is
the large number of components the C-T organization must
monitor and the difficulty of monitoring each one. These
components are the terrorists, incidents, and supporters
that must be monitored. While the FBI does not fully
disclose the number of domestic terrorist groups, they did
report pre-empting 10 domestic terrorist events in 1998
alone (Freeh, 1999) . In 1999 the FBI reported an increasing
number of prosecutions of WMD cases since 1995, rising from
37 in 1996 to 74 in 1997, and 181 in 1998 with three-
quarters of these cases threatening a biological release
(Freeh, 1999) . While many of these incidents were hoaxes,
they must sill be dealt with and add to the complexity of
the environment.
Another component adding to the complexity the C-T
organization faces are the supporting elements that must be
monitored. A supporting element can be a state sponsor, a
transportation network, bomb making materials, storage
facilities, or other logistical resources necessary to carry
out an attack. The Department of State in the 1999 Global
Terrorism Report declared that 7 states are still sponsoring
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terrorists and listed 28 terrorist groups that are foreign,
engage in terrorist activity, and threaten the security of
U.S. citizens or the national security of the United States
(Sheehan, 1999) . In order to conduct the World Trade Center
bombing, Yousef was trained and supported while outside the
U.S and within the U.S. friends and conspirators supported
him with money, living quarters, and construction
assistance. Another supporting element was the availability
of bomb making materials and facilities. These supporting
elements are difficult to monitor and contribute to the
complexity of the C-T environment.
The second major factor that makes the C-T environment
high in complexity is the organization itself. As shown in
Figures 2 and 5, the C-T organization structure is highly
complex because of the number of agencies that must work
together to stop terrorism. An example of low
organizational complexity is a family owned gas station
because it can solve most of its problems without
coordinating with other gas stations or organizations to
solve its problems. The C-T organization faces high
organization complexity because it involves multiple
agencies from all branches of local, state, and federal
governments to counter terrorism.
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We have argued that the C-T organization faces a
situation of high complexity. We used two characteristics
of the C-T environment to show how highly complex this
environment is as opposed to less complex environments faced
by other organizations. Due to the combined effect of these
characteristics, we have assessed the environment faced by a
C-T organization to be highly complex.
4. Low Availability of Resources
In terms of local resources, no one community or region
is robust enough to support the financial and technical
requirements of all terrorist threats without the support of
the collective assets of the United States government. Some
of the resources required to effectively combat terrorism
are highly specialized and technical in nature and low in
availability. The low availability of C-T resources at the
local level is the reason we categorize resources as low in
availability. While we accept that the federal government
has created and is currently increasing a large pool of
specialized equipment, resources and personnel to combat
terrorism, it is still unavailable to the local responder
immediately and, for the most part, resources are tethered
to the initiation of the federal crisis management structure
we have described in this chapter. Therefore, in terms of
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local emergency operation systems these highly specialized
and technical resources are scarce.
Due to limited resource availability, the federal
government tries to cross-train and equip as many local law
enforcement agencies as possible. 4 This bolstering of the
local emergency responder effort has been a costly
undertaking of many federal agencies. As examples, the
federal government in order to counter the inherent risks of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
threats created new units in state National Guard called
RAID teams (Office of Secretary of Defense, 1998) . The act
of creating a new unit is evidence of the shortcoming of
people and materiel able to address the problem of C-T.
Additional evidence of the low availability of resources is
the cooperation of the national health services and the
Center for Disease Control with local health agencies in an
4 DoD and FEMA have been instructed to provide local first
responder training for actions against Weapons of Mass
Destruction prior to mid-2001. This training is being
conducted in a train- the-trainer manner. As of March 21,
2000, the GAO cited that DoD had trained 19,000 individuals
and the Department of Justice had trained 44,000
individuals. These efforts and the supporting equipment
that is received at the completion of the training is a
strong indicator of the presence of low resources present at
the local level. For further information see Combating
Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of
Mass Destruction Training, GAO/NSAID-00-64 , United States
General Accounting Office, 20 March 2000.
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effort to identify and acquire large quantities of antidotes
as a local response capability to terrorism (Hughes, 1999) .
Because of the lack of physical presence of equipment,
trained personnel, and, the scarcity of federal resources at
the local level to combat terrorism, we have categorized
resources as low in availability.
F. SUMMARY
As we have shown, the environment in which a counter-
terrorist organization must operate is low in problem
structuredness . Further, the problem of counter-terrorism
is high in task interdependence. We have explained that the
situation a C-T organization faces is also high in
complexity. Lastly, we have also shown that resources
needed to combat terrorism are low in local availability and
costly. Having explained the C-T situation in these terms,
we intend to use organizational design theory to develop a
counter-terrorism JTTF structure that will effectively
operate against these environmental conditions.
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III. COUNTER-TERRORISM ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
The counter- terrorism problem for the U. S takes place
in three unique environments: (1) foreign territories, (2)
inside the territorial boundaries of the United States, (3)
and in areas of national sovereignty (e.g., airplanes of
U.S. Companies) . The scope of our work is limited to the
organization used to counter terrorism inside the United
States. This limitation sharpens the focus to a single
counter- terrorism environment so that more specific
recommendations may be gleaned from our analysis.
The intent of this chapter is two- fold. Our first
intent is to utilize the similarities between the structure
of a multi-national corporation (MNC) , as defined by Nohria
and Ghoshal in The Differentiated Network (1997) , and the
structure of the domestic pre-emptive counter-terrorism
structure in order to develop a list of principles that
could be used to guide the construction of a pre-emptive
counter- terrorism organization. Our second intent is to
combine these principles with Thomas Cummings
Transorganizational Development (1984) theory in order to
develop additional principles that may help improve the
interaction processes of U. S. C-T organizations.
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A. U. S. COUNTER-TERRORISM AS A DIFFERENTIATED NETWORK
Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) define an MNC as a
"differentiated network"
:
...composed of distributed resources linked
through different types of relations: (1) the
"local" linkages within each national subsidiary,
(2) the linkages between headquarters and the
subsidiaries, and (3) the linkages between
subsidiaries themselves (p. 4)
.
The federal counter-terrorism structure can be defined
as a "differentiated network" . Like an MNC, this structure
operates at three levels: headquarters, subsidiary, and
local. Differentiated Network theory proposes that each
level of an organization should be organized based on its
local resources and its local environmental complexity in
order to optimally "fit" its environment. 5
As previously explained, the environment of terrorism
is highly complex and has low-available resources. The
following conceptual example paraphrased in The
Differentiated Network from Schmidt and Kochan (1997)
describes the complex environment faced by multi-
organizational systems like MNCs or the national system for
responding to counter-terrorism. While not written about
5 The term "fit" used in this paragraph refers to an implicit
understanding of organizational contingency theory as
presented by Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; J. D. Thompson,
1967; Galbraith, 1973. Nohria and Ghoshal accept this
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counter-terrorism, the parallels with the counter-terrorism
organization presented in Chapter II are apparent.
. . .Environmental complexity results in
increased interdependence as both the headquarters
and the subsidiary face a situation of mutual
vulnerability. Imperfect knowledge and
fluctuations in the environment induce both the
headquarters and the subsidiary to engage in
reciprocal exchange relationships to make the
realization of even independently disparate goals
more predictable over time. As the complexity of
the local environment in which the subsidiary is
located increases, the importance of local
knowledge increases, and the subsidiary must be
allowed greater influence in the decision-making
process. Extensive collaboration yields benefits
for both headquarters and the subsidiary;
consequently, interaction in these circumstances
is usually characterized by cooperation and
problem solving rather than conflict and
bargaining. (Nohria and Ghoshal, p. 96, 1997)
The concept of a differentiated network correlates well
to counterterrorism because there are parallels with the
network of political structures from different local, state,
and federal government elements that address counter-
terrorism. Differentiated network theory offers ideas on
how to facilitate integration between the differing
governmental entities.
The primary difference between the MNC's and C-T
organization systems is authority. In the MNC, the
theory as base paradigm from which they are able to present
the concepts of the differentiated networks.
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headquarters has direct authority to make decisions and
order local elements to comply. This is not the case in the
C-T network organization. In the C-T organization, local
law enforcement agencies cannot be compelled in the same
manner. However, the lack of authority between local, state
and federal elements does not relieve the FBI from the
requirement assigned in PDD-63 that it be the lead federal
agency in regards to domestic counter-terrorism. These
conflicting points of authority increase the organizational
challenge facing domestic terrorism in the United States.
Because of the authority conflict, we have decided to
examine the role of headquarters that face the challenges of
directing multiple agencies without the benefit of authority
or a formalized communication system. We examine C-T
organizations at the state, county, and local levels as
subsidiaries to the headquarters level FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Forces. The Emergency Operation Services (EOS) centers
recognize the need to be linked to the federal structure
through the JTTF in order to increase their resources and
information. Because of the information and resource
superiority the JTTF possesses, the JTTF must function in
the role of a headquarters in order to prioritize efforts
and resources prior to and during an incident
.
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In addition to the limitations of headquarters
communications systems, another element complicates the
multi -agency C-T effort. As detailed in Chapter 2, the JOC
combines elements of the FBI headquarters, local and state
law enforcement, and members of emergency and health
services in an action capacity. As such, the JOC
encompasses three roles of headquarters immediately upon its
formation. One, it must process information from various
other subsidiaries; two, the JOC must report its actions and
new information to its higher authority; and three, the JOC
centralizes key decision-makers of the Unified Command
Structure
.
We have now narrowed our understanding of the JTTF C-T
network sufficiently to use elements of the two
organizational theories as tools that will help us
understand the constraints of authority and reporting. The
first question we examine using Differentiated Network and
Transorganizational Systems is what are the most important
structural elements that we should use to guide the
development of the JTTF?
B. THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF A COUNTER-TERRORISM
ORGANIZATION
Nohria and Ghoshal assert "centralization,
formalization, and normative integration . . . constitute a
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fairly comprehensive characterization of the structure of
headquarters-subsidiary relations." (p. 97) Therefore, we
will focus our efforts on centralization, formalization and
normative integration.
Centralization is the degree to which the headquarters
element exerts control over strategic policy and procedure
decisions. Nohria and Ghoshal categorize centralization as
low, moderate, or high. An example of high centralization
in the C-T organization would be if the FBI Agent In Charge
of the JOC made all the decisions for all organizations in
the JOC. This is not possible because, while the FBI may
have jurisdiction, they do not control the local
participating agencies. Low centralization in the JOC would
mean that all participating organizations acted on their own
and only reported their actions to the JOC. Moderate
centralization in the JOC would mean that participating
organizations coordinate with each other and make decisions
by consensus. Moderate centralization also means that
participating C-T organizations do not have to ask their
higher headquarters for permission to take action.
Centralization is important to the C-T organization because
the level of centralization directly impacts the efficiency
of problem solving.
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The second structural element is formalization. The
degree of formalization in an organization is measured by
the presence of and reliance on formal systems, established
rules, and proscribed procedures (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).
Formalization is evident and useful in the counter-terrorism
structure because it facilitates information sharing in the
absence of a hierarchic authority system. Formalization
allows both the "headquarters and subsidiary [to] react
flexibly to complex environments while assuring continued
pursuit of a mutually beneficial company goal that underlies
the system of rules." (p. 100)
The last structural element is normative integration.
This structural element deals with the social norms of the
corporate structure. Normative integration is "the common
set of values that minimizes divergent interests, emphasizes
mutual interdependence, and leads to domain consensus" (p.
100) . If interagency cooperation is to succeed normative
integration must be high because of the large number of
actors in the networked C-T organization and their
interdependence. The JTTF C-T network organization uses the
UCS to facilitate interagency cooperation. The UCS requires
decision making by consensus and normative integration is
important to the process because it encourages cooperation.
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Normative integration is significant because the resulting
shared values allow multiple organizations to work together
and recognize common issues and objectives.
In summary, Nohria and Ghoshal offer the following
advice for a C-T structure. In an environment of high
complexity and low resources the pre-emptive counter-
terrorism organization ought to have moderate centralization
and low formalization. Given moderate centralization and
low formalization, the counter-terrorism structure should
rely on normative integration mechanisms to form the social
structure of the organization.
This characterization is summarized in cell C3 of
Figure 6 from Nohria and Ghoshal. The other three cells
present the organizational characteristics appropriate for







C3 Clans C4 Integrative
Centralization: Centralization: Low
Moderate Formalization: Moderate
Formalization: Low Socialization: High
Socialization: High
CI Hierarchy- C2 Federative
Centralization: High Centralization: Low
Formalization: Low Formalization: High
Socialization: Low Socialization* Low
Low Subsidiary Resources -> High
Figure 6. Hypothesized Fit Structure of the Headquarters-




Because a C-T organization always operates in a highly
complex environment and available resources for the C-T
organization may increase from low to high in times of
crisis, we will only focus on cells C3 and C4 . Figure 7 is
a simplified diagram showing the level of each structural
element needed to fit the C-T organization to the C-T
situation. According to Figure 6, an organization operating
in a highly complex environment with low resources will work
optimally if it has characteristics of moderate
centralization, low formalization and high normative
integration. The cell that reflects this condition is the
C3—Clans cell. The C3 quadrant parallels the conditions of
a JTTF prior to entering the integrative process of a JOC
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during a crisis. Therefore we have labeled the C3 quadrant
JTTF.











Low Low Subsidiary Resources High
Figure 7: Headquarters-Subsidiary Structure for Counter-
Terrorism. From Ref . [Nohria and Ghoshal, p. 103]
.
The JTTF headquarters must be organized in a manner
that facilitates transition into a JOC if the U.S. is to
effectively combat terrorism. The JOC has an increased
level of authority with which to request and obtain
resources because of the nature of an impending incident
.
This means that an increased number of organizations will be
present with equipment and resources and resource levels
will shift from low to high. Complexity will remain high
because of the problems created by this influx of personnel,
equipment and materiel
.
According to Differentiated Network theory, once the
JOC is formed and resource levels increase, the level of
formalization should be moderate and centralization should
be low. We agree with increasing the level of formalization
once the JOC is formed and resource levels increase and we
will return to this point again in Chapter 4. However,
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centralization should remain moderate because the JOC should
continue to make decisions by consensus. Centralization in
the JOC cannot be high because even though the FBI functions
in the JOC as the lead federal agency, they still rely on
cooperation from other agencies and do not have the
authority to tell local agencies what to do. Centralization
in the JOC should not be low because in order for the JOC to
function efficiently, all participating agencies must
coordinate their actions and come to agreement on how to
solve problems. Therefore, we have modified the C4 cell of
Figure 7 to reflect moderate centralization. We have also
labeled it JOC because of the increase in resources. In the
next section we will focus on normative integration because
of its requirement to be high in conditions of both low and
high resource availability.
C. NORMATIVE INTEGRATION MECHANISMS
Normative Integration mechanisms are the social
structure of the organization. Nohria and Ghoshal describe
five normative mechanisms. The first three elements are
selection, training, and rotating leadership. The forth and
fifth are inter-unit communications and interpersonal
networks. The fourth and fifth mechanisms support the





Integrative mechanisms are important to the C-T network
because they develop a common C-T culture and context
different from the individual participating agencies'
culture and context (Nohria and Ghoshal , 1997) . .
a. Selection In The C-T Differentiated Network
In a pre-emptive counter-terrorism organization,
normative integration mechanisms may prove to be the most
useful. Selection, in terms of which agency is included in
the C-T network, is a characteristic not evident in Nohria
and Ghoshal ' s conceptionalization of MNCs because they see
the elements of the networked MNC system as fixed and
stable. In contrast, the formulation of a C-T organization
is much more fluid because it is being created to respond to
the crisis demands of a potential or actual terrorism
incident
.
b. Training In The C-T Differentiated Network
Training is critical to implementing normative
integration mechanisms. Training also provides the residual
effect of validating the previously discussed integrating
mechanism of selection as well as rotation of leadership
which we discuss next. (Trans-organizational theory
presented later in this chapter will offer insight on how
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best to approach training integration.) Foremost, training
confirms the internalization of broad organization themes,
policies, and procedures at the lowest level of the
organization. In the multi -agency environment of the JTTF,
training is probably one of the most effective means in
determining readiness.
c. Leadership In The C-T Differentiated Network
The next normative integration mechanism
recommended by Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) is rotating
leadership. Rotating leadership can provide positive
effects on the organization through horizontal mobility of
mid-level management. Rotating leadership also encourages
the development of a diverse network of contacts, which have
an intangible value to the organization's operating
efficiency, especially during a crisis. This may be a
difficult system for the C-T organization to emulate because
it would be very inefficient for people to move from one
agency such as the FBI to another agency such as a local
fire department
.
2 . Differentiated Network Support Systems
The last two normative integration mechanisms provide
support to the organizational structure. The ability of the
JTTF to successfully change into a JOC will hinge
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significantly on the emplacement of support systems that
create a seamless communications and control network. While
the integrating mechanisms aforementioned contribute
significantly to the effectiveness of the JTTF and JOC
organization, the foundation of redundant, secure, and
robust 6 inter-unit communications and interpersonal networks
must be attended to first. These two personal/technical




The first element is inter-unit communications.
The presence of a robust JTTF inter-unit communication
network is represented by the conveyance of information.
The inter-unit communication network of the JTTF C-T
structure should be built upon a foundation of lateral
networks among participating agencies. Nohria and Ghoshal
hypothesize that the greater the number of inter-agency
working groups, committee meetings, and conferences that are
held, the stronger lateral networks will be among managers.
6 Robust Communications: Communication Networks with
multiple send and receive nodes. Redundant Communications:
Communication Networks that offer various mediums, such as
FM, VHF, UHF, and SATCOM to the headquarters. Secure
Communications: Communications Networks that have the
capability to cipher their text and voice messages during
transmission.
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Nohria and Ghoshal further offer that these meetings will
cause a strong technical inter-unit communication network to
develop that facilitates the necessary interagency
coordination. Inter-unit communications supported by
hardware systems and collaborative processes (e.g.,
interagency committees) may be the second most important
consideration to a functional pre-emptive organization, and,
in fact, may be of equal importance as training.
Jb. Interpersonal Networks
The second supporting element is interpersonal
networks. This is, in some respects, a non-quantifiable
element of the pre-emptive counter-terrorism network
organization. Interpersonal networks are defined in terms
of personal contacts a member can turn to in a time of
crisis (Nohria and Ghoshal, p. 153) . Through interpersonal
networks, an organization can increase the potential level
and availability of required resources. Making contact with
high-level participants can increase the amount and
availability of resources.
D. SUMMARY APPLIED TO C-T ORGANIZATIONS
In summary, Nohria and Ghoshal offer that in an
environment of high complexity and low resources the pre-
emptive counter- terrorism organization ought to have
moderate centralization and low formalization. Given
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moderate centralization and low formalization, the counter-
terrorism structure should rely on normative integration
mechanisms. Further, as resource levels increase we have
explained why the C-T organization should continue to seek
moderate centralization but increase to moderate
formalization; and must also rely on normative integration
mechanisms
.
E. TRANSORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY
A single theoretical construct will not alone determine
an appropriate organization design for a C-T organization.
For this reason, we will inspect the insights of Thomas
Cummings' theory for Transorganizational Development (1984)
.
Cummings' theory provides additional considerations on how
to best organize groups of organizations joined for a common
cause. Using the ideas of Cummings' interaction processes
(how organizations work together) as additional principles
in our organizational construct serves to improve the
efficiency of the organizations in the C-T network as they
interact in the JTTF. Our goal in applying the analysis of
Cummings' principles to the C-T structure is to ensure that
our JTTF headquarters construct recognizes the critical
organization principles that will positively influence




Transorganizational Development is a theory that
attempts improve the effectiveness of groups of
organizations that have joined together for a common purpose
(Cummings, 1984) . Such a group is called a
transorganizational system (TS) (Cummings, 1984) . This
theory provides a useful framework in which to study the
organization of counter terrorism efforts, since to counter
terrorism, groups of organizations with different resources
and jurisdictions must join in a common cause. It is
important to note that Cummings is primarily concerned with
developing entirely new multi-organization systems but also
states his model can be a useful tool in examining an
existing transorganizational system.
We intend to show that Cummings' integrative framework
uses four key interaction processes that can be broken down
into a typology in which three are most relevant to counter
terrorism. We will then use these three processes to
examine the JTTF as a headquarters organization. The main
elements in Cummings' framework are shown in Figure 8, which
illustrates how organizational effectiveness (outcomes) are
affected by the environment, task/problem, inputs, and
interaction processes.
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INPUT h. OUTCOME- w w
Figure 8 Integrative Framework for Transorganizational
Systems From Ref. [Cummings, 1984, p. 376].
The interaction processes provide a logical starting
point for understanding how transorganizational systems (TS)
work (Cummings, 1984) . The four key interaction processes
are: (a) the level of effort member organizations expend on
interacting with each other; (b) the coordination of those
efforts; (c) the performance strategies used by member
organizations in carrying out the shared task/problem; (d)
the level and utilization of organizations' knowledge,
skills, and resources applied to the task (Cummings, 1984)
.
Cummings also organizes these interaction processes in
a framework based on problem structuredness and task
interdependence. He suggests that problem structuredness
and task interdependence are important contingencies that
significantly determine which interaction processes are most
important to TS success (Cummings, 1984) . As we explained
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in Chapter II the counter-terrorism situation is one of low
problem structuredness and high task interdependence. For
example, everyone in a C-T organization has to work together
but there is no one way to solve the problem. Figure 9
shows high and low levels of problem structuredness and task
interdependence with the corresponding most important
interaction processes. For example, because of low problem
structuredness and high task interdependence as in the
terrorism situation, TS performance is influenced most by
coordination of effort, performance strategies, and the
level and utilization of knowledge, skills, and resources.
Because the counter-terrorism situation puts us in the
bottom right quadrant in Figure 9, we intend to focus our
study on coordination of effort, performance strategies (how
organizations solve problems) , and level and utilization of






























Figure 9 Interaction of TS Problem and Interaction
Processes From Ref . [Cummings, 1984, p. 376]
.
1. Coordination of Effort (Integrating Devices)
According to Cummings (1984), coordination of effort
involves five primary integrating devices: (a) leadership;
(b) structure; (c) compatible features; (d) communication
processes; and, (e) positive assessments. For the scope of
this thesis we will focus on leadership and structure.
a . Leadership
Leadership can come from a variety of sources
(Cummings, 1984) . Mandates or funding that cause
organizations to work together can be a form of leadership.
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Leadership could also come from a charismatic individual who
feels compelled to take action and has the authority to
institute change. Further, Cummings states that leadership
time is most often spent on building exchange relationships,
resolving interagency conflicts, and managing the interface
among participating agencies (Cummings., 1984).
b. Structure
Another integrating mechanism is structure. This
variable can be implemented to serve as a substitute for
leadership when the intensity of interactions between
organizations increases to a level that individual
leadership can no longer keep up (Cummings, 1984) . As the
intensity of interactions between organizations increases,
organizations must attempt to formalize exchanges through
rules, policies and standard procedures in order to achieve
goals (Cummings, 1984) . We will discuss the level of
formalization in a C-T organization further in Chapter IV.
2 . Performance Strategies
Performance strategies are another interaction process
variable affecting TS outcomes. These are the primary
mechanisms that organizations use to solve problems.
Cummings outlines four methods for helping TSs develop or
change performance strategies: (1) direction setting; (2)
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diagnosis; (3) frame breaking of collective definitions;
and (4) changing networks (Cummings, 1984)
.
a. Direction Setting
Direction setting is the process of establishing
valued ends and clarifying shared direction for action
(Cummings, 1984). Further, direction setting is mainly-
concerned with reaching a consensus on how to solve the
problem and second, by developing specific action plans or
strategies to achieve the desired outcome (Cummings, 1984)
.
b. Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the systematic collection and
dissemination of data about the TS for the purpose of
learning about it and possibly changing it (Cummings, 1984)
.
Someone outside the organization typically does this process
and provides feedback to the organizations working together.
c. Frame Breaking of Collective Definitions
Collective definitions give legitimacy and meaning
to an organization's actions (Cummings, 1984). Frame
breaking is needed to disrupt persistent problems in the
interactions between different organizations. Breaking
collective definitions that impede collaboration can be done
by creating a new language, or history, and by myth making
(Cummings, 1984) . For example if local law enforcers have a
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negative perception of the FBI, they may not share
information with them or work together with them. One way
to fix this problem would be to unify the two organizations
by giving them a common goal of and a common language for
countering terrorism.
d. Changing Networks
The final method of helping a TS change or improve
its performance is by changing the network relationships
within participating organizations (Cummings, 1984). The
factor that significantly influences the ease or difficulty
in changing network relationships is how loosely or tightly
coupled the network is; that is, how well norms are shared
and enforced (Cummings, 1984) . It is important to ensure
that the network is sufficiently tight so norms are shared
and enforced and the direction of those norms support
coherence in TS performance strategies (Cummings, 1984).
3 . Level and Utilization of Resources
There is one final interaction process variable
identified by Cummings as being relevant to the C-T context
of low problem structuredness and high task interdependency
(see Figure 5) . This is the level and utilization of
participating organizations' knowledge, skills, and
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resources applied to the task or problem. This variable is
primarily affected by the composition of the TS
.
There are two related approaches to determining
appropriate TS composition: (1) the expanding network
model, and (2) stakeholder analysis. The expanding network
model involves starting with a smaller core group and
expanding to more organizations as the need for additional
resources are identified (Cummings, pp., 389-390).
Stakeholder analysis is primarily concerned with selectively
recruiting organizations and groups affected by the problem
that have a stake in its solution (Cummings, p., 390) . This
approach is extremely important when developing a new TS but
also has applications after a TS has been formed. Both of
these approaches to TS composition will be discussed in
Chapter IV.
F. INTEGRATING THE THEORIES
We intend to use Differentiated Networks and
Transorganizational Development theories to study currently
formed counter- terrorism organizations and provide
suggestions for future development. We developed a table
shown in Figure 10 which integrates the two theories. The
left side of the table shows organizational principles that
support an effective C-T organization. The right side of
the table shows the organizational characteristics and
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activities we used to measure the principle. In Chapter IV
we will give our evaluation of two C-T organizations we
studied using the chart in Figure 10.
To evaluate this
Principle
We looked for these
Characteristics and Activities
Moderate Centralization Consensus Working Group
Training
Decision Authority,
Low Formalization Few Interagency Guidelines
Intelligence Sharing Agreements
Decision Process
Shared Rules and Policies
Integrating Mechanisms Inter-unit Communications
Inter-personal networks
Leadership Focused on Coordination
Team Building
Rotational Leadership
Direction setting Goal Setting
Action plans
Diagnosis External/Internal Assessments
Frame breaking New Language
New History




Composition and Selection of
Participating Organizations
Figure 10. C-T Organization Fit Categories
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In this chapter we examine the current C-T organization
using the key principles outlined in Chapter 3. We gathered
our data from three sources: 1) The Monterey County Office
of Emergency Services, 2) Los Angeles Emergency Operation
Center Terrorism Working Group, 3) Open source archival
data. We conducted interviews, observed exercises, and
studied various open source reports and documents.
We observed the Monterey County Office of Emergency
Services (OES) while it was conducting training exercises.
We chose this organization because it represents the local
mult i -agencies that would collaborate during a crisis much
like a JTTF. The Director of Emergency Operations
familiarized us with the Standard Emergency Management
System (SEMS) . We observed three training exercises
conducted by the Office of Emergency Services led by the
Director of the Emergency Operations Center. These
exercises involved support agencies from the Monterey County
Sheriffs Department, Monterey County Fire Department,
California Highway Patrol, Monterey County Health Services
and various other support agencies.
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We observed the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations
Center Early Warning Group during its preparation for the
Democratic National Convention (DNC) . We chose to examine
this organization because it involves the collaboration of
multi -agencies much like a JOC . We observed the Center's
preparations and were given briefings and information by the
Director of the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) . We
spent two days observing operations of the TEW. We observed
planning meetings, which involved participants from many
government agencies to include the FBI, California National
Guard, the LAPD, LA Airport Police, Center of Disease
Control, local Fire Departments and various other federal
and state agencies.
We have organized the results according to the
principles presented in Chapter III. We will review the
principle, state our assessment, and explain how we came to
this assessment. In Chapter V we will give conclusions and
recommendations based on our findings.
B. CENTRALIZATION
Centralization is the degree to which the headquarters
element exerts control over policy and procedure decisions.
According to the theories we are using, the C-T organization
should seek a moderate form of centralization. An example
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of high centralization in a C-T organization would be if the
FBI Special Agent in Charge made all the decisions for each
agency in the JTTF . Low centralization for the C-T
organization would mean that all agencies in the JTTF would
act on their own and would not reach an agreement on
specific courses of action. Moderate centralization means
that one agency does not make all decisions but rather a
consensus between organizations is attained before a
specific course of action is taken. In order to assess the
degree of centralization in the C-T organization, we
evaluated three areas. The three areas are: Consensus
Working Groups, Training, and Decision Authority.
1 . Consensus Working Group
We observed a consensus -working group at the TEW for
the DNC and at the Monterey Office of Emergency Services.
The participants were all involved in problem solving and
decision-making and no one headquarters had total decision
making authority. Each agency used Federal, State, and
Local directives as a guideline for decision-making.
2 . Training
At the Monterey OES the training events were hosted and
organized by the Director of Emergency Services. The
training events were exercises centered on hypothetical
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scenarios that tested various emergency response systems.
All participants were to participate in decision-making. In
other words, the Director of the Monterey OES organized the
event but the training itself focused on decentralized
decision-making. At the DNC, the Director of the TEW
organized and ran the training events. This training also
focused on decision-making by consensus and getting multiple
organizations to solve a common problem. In both cases
goals and strategies were accomplished using the UCS
.
3 . Decision Authority
The decision authority we observed followed the
guidelines of the Unified Command Structure outlined by the
California Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations.
During one exercise, conducted by the Monterey County
Emergency Operations Services, it was clear that the
location of decision authority depended on the situation.
For example the decision to declare a disaster would be made
by the Director of the Emergency Operations Center and
County Commissioners. Therefore, because decisions were
made by consensus, centralization is moderate.
4. Assessment
The C-T organizations we observed displayed a moderate
degree of centralization. Centralization is moderate
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because no one organization has sole decision making
authority and multiple agencies make decisions based on a
common strategy or goals developed by consensus. We find
the current level of centralization in the JTTF and JOC
matches the level of centralization suggested by Nohria and
Ghoshal for the JTTF and our modified interpretation of
Nohria and Ghoshal (as described in Chapter III) for the
JOC.
C. FORMALIZATION
The degrees of formalization in an organization are
reflected by the presence of and reliance on formal systems,
established rules, and proscribed procedures to make
decisions. (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997) An organization with
high formalization would have many rules and regulations and
would rely on them to make decisions and solve problems. An
organization with low formalization would not rely on any
written regulations and rules for problem solving. An
organization with moderate formalization would solve
problems using written rules as a general guideline to
problem solving.
1. Few Interagency Guidelines
We examined the Interagency Guidelines as a measurement
of formalization. The interagency guidelines in the
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California Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations
demonstrates an emphasis on developing rules and for sharing
critical resources and the prioritization of incidents.
Formalization still remains low because, while participation
in SEMS is required by statute, decision makers do not rely
on these regulations to make decisions. Further, the C-T
organization is not required to follow a precise checklist
but uses these guidelines to assist the decision-making
process
.
2. Intelligence Sharing Agreements
A member of the Monterey County Sherriff's department
told us that intelligence-sharing agreements exist between
Federal, State and Local law enforcement agencies. Most of
these agreements have been in place for many years and are
general in nature and not specific to terrorism. This does
not affect our assessment of formalization because these
agreements are primarily in placed to facilitate information
sharing and not decision making.
3 . Decision Process
The decision processes we observed at the Democratic
National Convention and during our observations at the
Monterey OES tabletop exercises were not highly formalized.
We observed the agencies using the common goals and
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objectives established by the UCS to direct their individual
agency responses, but we did not see a formalized decision
process. For example, if an agency participating in the
protection of the DNC wanted to do something, they
coordinated with the Director of the TEW. He then followed
the objectives of the UCS and coordinated with other
agencies in order to gain a consensus.
4. Shared Rules and Policies
At the State and Local level we observed shared rules
and policies mandated by SEMS . These rules are outlined in
the California Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency-
Operations (1998) and both the LA TEW and the Monterey
County OES followed these guidelines. The C-T organizations
we observed only use them as a general guideline for problem
solving and therefore formalization was low. This is
appropriate for day-to-day operations, however during a
crisis these guidelines would be relied on more heavily for
problem solving and formalization would become moderate.
5. Assessment
Formalization is currently low in the C-T organization
structure. While formal systems, established rules, and
proscribed procedures exist, they are primarily used to
facilitate coordination and communication between
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participating agencies. These rules and procedures do not
constrain the ability of the C-T organization to make
decisions and, therefore, we assess formalization as low in
the C-T organization. However, we recognize the need for an
increased formalization as resources increase in the
organization during a time of crisis.
D. NORMATIVE INTEGRATION MECHANISMS
1. Inter-Unit Communications
At the DNC we did not observe a formalized process for
establishing communications but we did observe a large
communication network that consisted of radio, video,
telephonic, and electronic message systems. We did not
observe a separate committee responsible for establishing
and maintaining communications with all agencies, however
communications seemed to work. Inter-unit communications
did appear to be robust
.
2 . Interpersonal Networks
We were unable to gather enough data on this
characteristic to ascertain its level of contribution to
formalization.
3 . Assessment
Integrative mechanisms in C-T organizations were high.
Inter-unit communications were robust and sufficient to
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facilitate information sharing and coordination in both
organizations we examined.
E. LEADERSHIP
As explained by Cummings, leadership can come from a
variety of sources. In order to look for the presence of
leadership we looked at coordination, team building, and
rotational leadership. Coordination is a leadership
approach that can help resolve conflicts between
organizations by increasing interface between participating
agencies. Team building is a characteristic of leadership
and can increase the efficiency of an organization by
building relationships.
1. Coordination
We did not observe a centralized planning calendar
between Local, State, and Federal officials for training,
meetings, or conferences. A well -coordinated effort among
the multi-agencies participating in a JTTF would facilitate
an effective multi-agency system. We did observe effective
coordination between agencies participating in the TEW and
the Monterey County EOS. For example the local agencies
were able to meet at a common place at a common time with
little or no problems. However, coordination between local
organizations and state and higher levels could be improved.
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2. Team Building
We did observe the beginning of team building in both
the LA TEW and the Monterey Office of Emergency Services.
Team building was evident in the posting of positions,
establishment of rosters, and the familiarity of
participants with co-workers. Much of the training and
participation we observed in the LA TEW Group and the
Monterey County OES promote a strong team ethic and will
only grow as the organizations mature. This observation is
based primarily on the sense of unity and shared goals we
observed between the agencies when they were working and
training together. For example, we observed a local agency
and a federal agency resolve jurisdiction problems without
conflict or appeal to a higher authority. We believe this
example illustrates a sense of unity and shared goal between
these organizations.
3 . Rotational Leadership
None Observed.
4 . Assessment
At the local level, coordination and team building are
present and effective. A stronger leadership presence
through training sponsorship, calendar development, and
coordinated procedures could be developed by the JTTF. This
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form of stronger leadership by the JTTF would facilitate
better and more effective coordination between all agencies
and levels of local, state, and federal C-T responders.
Although not observed, we do believe rotational leadership
could have positive effects on the C-T organization. This
will be discussed in Chapter V.
F. DIRECTION SETTING
Cummings states that direction setting is the process
of establishing valued ends and clarifying shared direction
for actions. Initially, direction setting is concerned with
establishing by consensus who does what, and second by
developing specific action plans or strategies to achieve
outcomes. In order to look for the presence of direction
setting we looked for goal setting and action plans.
1. Goal Setting
The Terrorism Working Group and the Monterey OES both
exhibited goal setting to help focus their Action Plan
development. For example, the Monterey County EOS has
published goals for crisis action planning clearly displayed
on the wall in the EOC. We observed goal setting at the LA
EOC for the DNC by the posting of exercise objectives. The
goals of the LA EOC Terrorism Working Group were achieved
through consensus and reflect the individual goals of each
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agency. In other words, each agency provided input which
was used to create goals for the TEW.
2 . Action Plans
Action plans are required by the CA OES and were
readily apparent in the preparation by the LA EOC prior to
the DNC . The Monterey OES tabletop exercises did not
possess these formalized action plans but the table top
exercises were scripted training scenarios and not an
operational contingency like the DNC. Action Plan
development is a codified process among state agencies in
California. The process is recorded in the California OES
Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations (1998) . All
participating agencies in the LA TEW demonstrated a
fundamental understanding of Action Plan development during
execution of the Special Event EOC at the DNC. An area to
be improved in Action planning is mult i -agency
implementation. Multi-agency implementation is the
development, understanding, and utilization by external
federal and state agencies of products developed by a JTTF
or TEW to respond to a potential or actual incident. The
reason mult i -agency Action Plan implementation needs
improvement is because of the involvement of many civilian
and federal agencies that are not specifically familiar with
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the format and terminology of the California Standardized
Emergency Management System (SEMS) . We believe this
observation has nation-wide applicability.
3 . Assessment
Goal setting is working because SEMS makes the UCS a
priority from the outset of a mult i -agency incident'.
However, goal setting could be improved with a more
deliberate process of direction setting. Action planning is
effective at the local level. Multi-agency implementation
must be improved.
G. DIAGNOSIS
Cummings states that diagnosis is the systematic
collection and dissemination of data about an organization
for the purpose of improving it. He also states that
typically someone outside the organization completes this
task. In order to look for the presence of diagnosis we
examined external assessments and internal assessments.
1. External Assessments
We did not observe any external assessments taking
place at the DNC or at the Monterey OES . The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) has done assessments but these GAO
reports focus on assessing federal expenditures and
utilization of funds rather than on increasing
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organizational operating efficiency. 7 The GAO reports,
however, still provide insight on the larger scope of issues
facing the C-T organization.
2 . Internal Assessments
We observed internal assessments taking place in both
the DNC and the Monterey OES . The internal assessments took
the form of brief-backs led by the Director of each of the
agencies. The focus of these brief backs in the case of the
Monterey County tabletop exercise was on the current
scenario. However, we did not observe previous assessments
being used to plan future exercises.
3 . Assessment
External assessments should be focused at local levels
and should be conducted. Internal assessments should be
more regimented. An internal assessment format needs to be
developed. The assessments should be used to systematically
incorporate results into plans which will improve existing
procedures and policies.
'See Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons
of Mass Destruction Training, (GAO/NSIAD-00-64 ) , March 20, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs),
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, April 6 2000. Combating Terrorism: Comments on
HR4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs, (GAO/T-NSAID- 00-
172) , May 4, 2000.
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H. FRAME BREAKING
Cummings states that frame breaking is a process of
creating a new language or history between organizations in
order to break down perceptions that could impede
collaboration. While creating a new language or history
might not be a specific objective when creating a new
organization, this often occurs in effective multi-agency
organizations. To examine the presence of frame breaking we
looked for the use of a new language or the creation of a
new history.
1 . New Language
We did not observe any explicit attempts to form a new
language between C-T organizations. We did observe at both
case sites a common terminology. The foremost example of
the development of a new C-T language amongst members of the
Monterey County EOS and the LA TEW was a understanding of
the terms "Crisis Management and Consequence Management" and
their implied SEMS structures.
2. New History
We did not observe any attempts to record new histories
for C-T organizations. However, because each special event
where terrorism might occur now requires a operational EOC
77
with JTTF support, there is a lineage of events and
participation anecdotes being created.
3. Assessment
Framing braking is occurring. The LA TEW and the
Monterey EOS represent organizations that are removing the
perception that mult i -agencies are inefficient at and'
incapable of working together for a common objective.
I. CHANGING NETWORKS
Another method of helping an organization improve its
performance is by changing network relationships. This is a
process of ensuring that network coupling is sufficient to
ensure norms are shared and enforced, and promote innovation
in performance strategies. We did not observe any attempts
between C-T organizations to change network coupling.
J. LEVEL AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES
This component is primarily affected by the composition
of the organization. As explained by Cummings (pp., 389-
3 90) this process involves determining who will be in the
organization. He offers two very similar methods of
selection, which we observed at the DNC and at the Monterey
OES.
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1. Expanding Network Model
The expanding network model involves starting with a
small core group of participants and expanding to more
organizations as the need for more resources is identified.
We observed the LA TEW using the expanding network model
during the DNC . For example, the TEW invited agencies that
did not have a stake in problem solving to participate in
and give input about the exercise.
2. Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder analysis is the process of selecting and
recruiting organizations and groups who are affected by the
problem and have a stake in its solution. This process was
simulated during each Monterey OES tabletop exercise. The
Director of the Monterey County Emergency Operations Center
invited new organizations to participate based on the input
of currently participating organizations and previous
exercises. This process is more useful when time is
constrained because it selects participants based on the
situation and only includes needed participants.
3 . Assessment
Our assessment is that both of these methods of




The C-T organizations we observed are generally
following the principles we tested. The level of
centralization in the C-T organizations we examined matched
our expectations in Figure 7. Formalization remains low in
the C-T organization even when resources increase which does
not match our expectations and we believe this area can be
improved. As expected, normative integration was high in
the C-T organizations we examined. Normative integration is
the strongest match between the hypothesis fits from the
theories, our interpreted expectations and our observations.
We expected this because of the common efforts of all law
enforcement personnel to react to crimes, specifically
terrorism. In Chapter V we will give some specific
recommendations for the C-T organizations based on our




In this chapter we intend provide some recommendations
about the C-T organization based on the organizational
principles we evaluated. We have organized our
recommendations according to the principles presented in




1 . Consensus Working Group
The JTTF should function as a consensus -working group
so that its participants can provide input for decision
making. The JTTF should be the headquarters for planning
regional training events. We believe this is an appropriate
recommendation because the JTTFs have regional orientation
and have an established network of local and state agencies
that are familiar with the topic of counter-terrorism and
the governing statues and codes. Further, we recommend that
local, state and federal agencies directed to organize to
combat terrorism begin by forming consensus working groups.
We recommend this form of organization because consensus
working groups are a rapid and efficient way for decision-
makers and participating agencies to assimilate the shared
values and resources available to address counter-terrorism.
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2 . Training
Because normative integration must be high for both the
JTTF and JOC we recommend an increased emphasis on training
at the JTTF level . The JTTF should produce a regional
centralized counter-terrorism training plan. This plan
should be coordinated with all local and state participants
in order to maximize participation. The federal government
should offer training funds to local and state agencies for
participation in these exercises by adding a section under
Title 18, Part I, Chapter 133 B. This chapter in the United
States Code addresses terrorism specifically and would be
helpful in codifying training efforts between local, state,
and federal agencies.
3 . Decision Authority
The Unified Command Structure should be used in crisis
management and C-T organizations should train often using
this method of decision-making. This method of decision-
making by consensus is paramount for successful C-T
organizations. We recommend using the Department of the
Army Field Manual for Staff Organization and Operations
(1997) military deliberate decision-making process as a
guide for this process but the process should remain as
informal as possible. This does not increase the
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formalization of the JTTF because it is establishing a
procedure that will not be implemented until a time of
crisis but would facilitate planning during crisis
management for the JOC. A common decision process would
actually decrease the time required for the JOC to arrive at




The number of interagency guidelines is appropriate and
should remain unchanged.
2. Intelligence Sharing Agreements
We recommend no change to the current system of
intelligence sharing systems.
3 . Decision Processes
We recommend that the JTTF maintain the informal
decision making by consensus for long-term planning and
coordination. The JTTF should create a more formalized
decision making process for pre-emptive crisis management.
This will not increase the level of formalization in the
JTTF because the formalized decision-making process will
only be used by the JOC. This consensus decision-making
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process by the JTTF will increase the formalization of the
JOC to moderate as we have recommended.
4 . Shared Rules and Policies
We see no need for a change in the level of shared
rules and policies.
D. NORMATIVE INTEGRATION MECHANISMS RECOMMENDATIONS
Today's technology allows for a myriad of applications
in inter-unit communications. Due to distances between
participating agencies, the JTTF should establish uniform
protocols for communication. This may require that elements
of the C-T Network structure at the subsidiary and local
levels be provided additional funding, technical expertise,
and manning specific to improve communications. This
additional funding could be tied to the Title 18, Part I,
Chapter 133B statutory change mentioned under training
recommendations. Another form of communication that may




We recommend that the JTTF establish a centralized
planning calendar for training events, meeting and
conferences. We also recommend that a website be created
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that grants access to all C-T organizations in order to
express lessons learned and information sharing. The
regional JTTF should host this site.
2 . Team Building
In order to foster team building, we recommend C-T
organizations establish regular and frequent training. We
also recommend that some form of social integration among
participants be planned by the JTTF that is separate from a
training or operational incident.
3 . Rotational Leadership
We did not observe rotational leadership and do not
recommend rotating leaders in C-T organizations. As noted
in our discussion of team building, these organizations will
function better with leaders who get to work with and know
each other over the long term.
However, we do recommend rotational leadership among
agencies for training purposes. We recommend selecting and
rotating key leaders from local and state C-T organizations
to key training events or operational incidents. For
example, the JTTF could give each county two seats for
observation of a training event. The county could then
select who attends the training event. These leaders would
have full access to all JTTF exercises and actual incidents
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in their region. This rotation of leadership would give
members of the local emergency operations organizations a
better understanding of counter-terrorism operations. In
turn, these members would be able to relate their
observations to other members of their C-T network.
F. DIRECTION SETTING RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Goal Setting
We recommend that goals within the C-T organization
should be set by consensus in order to ensure a common set
of objectives. It is essential that common objectives be
defined and accepted. We also recommend that the JTTF
establish long-term and short-term objectives.
2 . Action Plans
We recommend developing action plans for likely C-T
scenarios. For example, when a C-T organization conducts an
exercise, such as a terrorist attack on a dam, this training
exercise should result in an action plan for a dam attack.
Developing action plans in this manner facilitates
preparedness by capturing lessons learned from training.
Once these action plans are established for an event, they
could be tested during future training exercises in order to




We recommend that the JTTFs establish regional
assessment teams composed of local, state and federal C-T
organization members to evaluate counter-terrorism training
within their region. The external assessments should
culminate in written accounts of the activity and be
distributed to all regions. The domestic C-T web page
previously recommended could provide the vehicle for
conveying this information.
2 . Internal Assessments
We recommend using a regional -oriented web-site as
vehicle, we recommend that local and state officials post
the outcomes and lessons learned from small-scale exercises
to a central board where others can observe and share
information on these events. The internal assessments
format should be a part of the routine interaction of the
JTTF Terrorism Working Group. A record of these internal
assessments should be posted on the JTTF website.
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We do not recommend formalizing a new language because
the current language commonality between C-T organizations
is sufficient.
2 . New History
We believe that the recording of internal and external
assessments that we have previously recommended will result
in a new shared history among organizations participating in
C-T.
I. CHANGING NETWORKS RECOMENDATIONS
While we did not observe any effort to change the
current local, state and federal C-T network, we recommend a
future study be undertaken to evaluate the level at which
norms are shared and enforced among participating C-T
organizations
.
J. LEVEL AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES RECOMENDATIONS
We recommend using both the expanding network model and
stakeholder analysis for selecting participants in the C-T
organization.
K. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the
organizational design principles for an effective C-T
organization. The analysis examined how a United States
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inter-governmental organization structure should be formed
to facilitate a rapid transition to crisis management with
minimal warning time. The most important question we tried
to answer was what principles and/or processes would help
the United States organize more efficiently to combat
terrorism? We evaluated the current C-T organizational
structure at the local level using two organizational
theories designed to improve organizational efficiency when
multiple players join to solve a common problem.
Our evaluation revealed that the United States is
currently on the right track. We found that all individuals
at the local level of the C-T structure were bound by a
sense of service and an overarching goal of stopping
terrorism. This is the basis for normative integration, the
critical element in the models we used. We believe the
three most important findings of our research are: 1)
crisis management decision making and planning must be
consensus based, 2) training should be coordinated at the
regional JTTF level and supported and funded by the federal
government, 3) that more lessons learned and information




L. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has shown the need for future research in
the area of changing networks which includes an evaluation
of the level at which goals and norms are shared and
enforced among participating C-T organizations. Further, we
recommend additional studies be conducted at the JOC and
JTTF levels in an actual crisis.
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